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Infrastructure 
and Social Welfare 
in Metropolitan America
ublic infrastructure is an important part of a well-
functioning urban economy. Such infrastructure—defined 
here as publicly owned and maintained physical capital—has 
historically played a central role in allowing cities to grow by 
mitigating or reducing problems such as congested roadways, 
potholes, water-main breaks, and overcrowded schools. Yet 
while the benefit of some public works can hardly be disputed, 
a key policy issue is whether additions to our stock of public 
infrastructure provide overall benefits that exceed their costs.1 
That is to say, is the amount of infrastructure we have 
sufficient, or would we benefit from an increase? Another 
important question is, do our institutional structures promote 
efficient infrastructure investment decisions?
As these questions suggest, the status of urban public 
infrastructure is an important topic. Education and highway 
facilities are being stretched to their limits in fast-growing cities 
and suburbs, while concerns are being raised about the level 
and physical condition of public works in slower growing, 
older central cities.2
No doubt, public investment is an important function of 
government, and it is particularly crucial at the state and local 
level. In 1999, states and localities invested more than 
$210 billion in equipment, software, and structures (Table 1). 
By combining this amount with the nearly $43 billion in 
nondefense investments made by the federal government, we 
see that new gross public investment in 1999 exceeded a 
quarter-trillion dollars, or 2.7 percent of GDP. Moreover, the 
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• Infrastructure investment may indirectly affect 
firm productivity and household welfare 
through its impact on the location of economic 
activity.
• State infrastructure policies currently favor 
decentralization—the opening of new territory 
to development and the movement of firms 
and households from dense urban 
environments to the surrounding suburbs.
• Recent research, however, suggests that the 
clustering of producers and consumers in a 
given geographic area is economically and 
socially beneficial.
• In light of this research, institutional reforms 
that would change the management and 
direction of public infrastructure investment 
may be in order. Agencies authorized to 
choose and finance investments that promote 
regional well-being would most likely target 
more investment to central cities and less 
to the surrounding suburbs.
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stock of publicly owned nondefense capital in 1999 exceeded 
$4.5 trillion, or nearly 50 percent of GDP.3
Although complete data on the geographic distribution of 
this spending are not available, it is certain that a large share of 
these national totals, particularly the state and local portions, is 
going to public investment in and around America’s 
metropolitan areas. More than 200 million people reside in 
these areas, and the public investments made there affect the 
lives of a large and growing share of the U.S. population.4
Accordingly, the question of whether we should increase the 
amount of infrastructure available has received much attention 
from economists. This article puts that research into a broad 
perspective, attempts to draw policy conclusions from what is 
known, and suggests some directions for further research.
 Infrastructure investments can affect social welfare in two 
ways (see Appendix A). One way is by adding to economic 
growth. The relationship between infrastructure and economic 
growth has been the subject of intensive economic research 
over the past decade. The second way in which infrastructure 
investments can affect social welfare is by potentially 
improving the quality of life of those living in the invested area. 
For example, public parks, water systems, and other facilities 
can improve social welfare without having any effect on 
residents’ incomes. This article also examines this second 
channel, which has received less attention in the research, in 
part because the value of quality-of-life improvements is 
difficult to measure.
Infrastructure investments may also indirectly affect social 
welfare in ways that have not been fully considered in public 
policy or research, such as location behavior, that is, where 
activities occur. For example, public works attract activities, 
such as the building of office parks near airports or housing 
developments near local roads. Furthermore, location behavior 
affects both economic growth and the quality of life. 
Social Value of Public Investments: 
Direct Effects on Firms
and Households
Investments in public infrastructure may influence society’s 
general level of well-being in several different ways. In this 
section, we address what we refer to as infrastructure’s direct 
effects.
Infrastructure’s Value to Firms
The relationship between public investments and aggregate 
economic growth has been the subject of the bulk of recent 
infrastructure research by economists (Table 2 summarizes 
some of the findings). A storm of research in this area was 
touched off by a controversial study published by Aschauer 
(1989). Aschauer used national data for the postwar period to 
estimate the relationship between the nation’s stock of public 
capital and aggregate income, or GNP. His results suggested 
that the marginal productivity of public capital—the addition 
to total income that could be expected from additions to the 
public capital stock—was enormous. Aschauer’s most widely 
cited conclusion was that a 1 percent increase in the nation’s 
infrastructure stock would raise aggregate output by 
0.39 percent. This conclusion suggested that infrastructure was 
roughly twice as productive (at the margin) as private capital, 
and that the nation’s public capital deficit was very serious. 
Aschauer went on to argue that a significant share of the 
Table 1






Equipment and software 32,738 105,496
Structures 10,871 413,231
State and local 210,866 3,994,255




Other buildings 32,618 793,928
Highways and streets 54,766 1,300,053
Conservation and development 2,360 69,710
Sewer systems 10,344 322,166
Water supply 7,796 212,826
Other structures 10,854 307,807
Memo:  
Total (percentage of GDP) 2.7 48.50 
Federal 0.47 5.58
State and local 2.27 42.95
GDP     $9.3 trillion
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national productivity growth slowdown that began in the early 
1970s was because of declining rates of public investment. 
Aschauer’s study was immediately controversial. Because 
national time-series data tend to rise and fall together, skeptical 
researchers immediately focused on the statistical properties of 
his model (Hulten and Schwab 1991). Subsequently, the use of 
widely accepted statistical techniques eliminated the statistical 
significance of the time-series relationship between national 
infrastructure and economic growth (Aaron 1990). Criticism 
of the national approach quickly led to research that examined 
the effects of variation in public capital availability within the 
nation at the state or city level.
Like Aschauer, Munnell (1990) and Eberts (1986) estimated 
aggregate production functions, but used data for states and 
metropolitan areas, respectively. A 10 percent increase in 
private capital is usually assumed to raise output by about 
1.5 to 2.0 percent. Munnell estimated that a 10 percent increase 
in public capital would raise private output by about
1.5 percent. This estimate was both economically and 
statistically significant and fueled further interest in the 
possibility of large unexploited returns to public investment. 
More recent refinements to the aggregate production approach 
have focused even more thoroughly on the model’s statistical 
properties. In Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Garcia-Mila, McGuire, 
and Porter (1996), correction of the estimates for unobserved 
state-level characteristics reduces the output elasticity of public 
sector capital to zero. This suggests that the findings of Munnell 
resulted from correlations between infrastructure and 
unmeasured state traits. Another important study that used an 
analogous methodology found that although infrastructure 
had significantly positive effects on productivity, the price of 
new investment may ultimately exceed its benefits (Morrison 
and Schwartz 1996).5
Although there is some lingering controversy in the 
literature over whether infrastructure is, at the margin, 
productive at all in the aggregate, there seems to be general 
agreement that raising taxes to fund large additions to a 
particular state’s stock of public works would not have very 
large positive effects on aggregate income in that state. This 
generally held view is important because it suggests that 
arguments for substantial increases in investment in state 
infrastructure must be based on something other than 
productivity improvements, such as infrastructure’s value 
to household consumption.
Table 2







Eberts (1986) Standard metropolitan statistical
   areas over time
APF 0.04 No Manufacturing only
Aschauer (1989) National over time APF 0.3 - 0.4 NA Time-series  data
Munnell (1990) States over time APF 0.15 No
Holtz-Eakin (1994) States over time APF ~0 Yes
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) States over time APF ~0 Yes Negligible interstate spillovers
Garcia-Mila, McGuire, and Porter (1996) States over time APF ~0 Yes
Morrison and Schwartz (1996) States over time ACF 0.11 Yes Aggregate cost function 
Boarnet (1998) California counties over time APF Yes Negative intrastate spillovers
Rudd (2000)a Standard metropolitan statistical
   areas over time
Compensating 
variations
0.03 - 0.1 NA Cross-sectional data  
Haughwout (forthcoming)a Central cities over time Compensating  
variations
 0.0 - 0.03 Yes Large household consumption
   effects
Note: APF is aggregate production function; ACF is aggregate cost function.
a The dependent variables in the compensating variations studies are local land and labor prices.4 Infrastructure and Social Welfare in Metropolitan America
Infrastructure’s Value to Households 
The value of infrastructure as a contributor to quality of life  
has received little attention, in part because the value of 
unpriced goods is difficult to measure. However, the quality-
of-life benefits of public investments are nonetheless likely to 
be very important because households are heavy users of 
infrastructure systems. Indeed, some public works are 
specifically designed to benefit households alone, and the 
justification for their construction does not point to their value 
in generating economic growth. One example is the 
construction of public parks and recreation facilities. This very 
significant line item in the nation’s public capital budget seems 
clearly intended to provide direct benefits to households, with 
little regard for its effects on productivity.6 Furthermore, the 
quality-of-life benefits of public works are not necessarily 
limited to this class of investments. Even elements of “core 
infrastructure,” such as transportation and sewer and water 
systems, provide large direct benefits to households. 
These quality-of-life benefits for households are excluded 
from productivity studies that currently dominate the 
literature. Consider the effects of a new road from your home 
to your place of work that cuts your one-way commuting time 
from one hour to thirty minutes. Will you arrive early at work 
each day, or sleep somewhat later? The treatment of public 
works in the productivity literature implies that employees will 
choose to arrive early at work, increasing their output. But at 
least some workers will likely claim at least a portion of the time 
for themselves, by eating breakfast with their families or 
reading the paper longer each morning. This potential for 
increased leisure will not be accurately measured in standard 
studies of income or productivity, but is a benefit nonetheless, 
as it improves the well-being of the individuals whose homes 
are affected by the new road. Accounting for the consumption 
value of public works is thus an important, but difficult, task. 
Infrastructure investments may also reduce the availability 
of some quality-of-life benefits for household consumption. 
The classic example here is the often-argued case that 
investments in highway infrastructure induce more driving, 
which increases auto emissions and congestion, degrading the 
environment and consuming workers’ valuable leisure time 
(see, for example, Downs [1994, p. 8]). Since air pollution and 
time lost to congestion are unpriced negative factors that are 
not traded in markets, any increase in them will not be directly 
reflected in incomes, but will reduce welfare.7 
Few studies have tried to measure the consumption benefits 
of public investments on a large scale, but some evidence is 
available. Haughwout (forthcoming) uses a spatial equilibrium 
model to estimate the aggregate value that households put on 
public investments in central cities. In this model, households 
demand lower land prices and higher wages as compensation 
for living in locations with insufficient infrastructure. Using 
this method, Haughwout estimates that the present value to 
households of a $4.64 billion increase in central-city 
infrastructure is about $1.8 billion, far higher than the 
comparable benefit to firms. This estimate implies, however, 
that the aggregate benefit of such an investment is less than its 
cost, even when both household and firm benefits are 
included.8
The problems inherent in measuring the quality-of-life 
benefits of public works have led to an overemphasis on 
relatively easy-to-observe productivity effects. Whether these 
effects are large or not is only one part of the answer to the 
nation’s public investment question. By themselves, findings 
that policies designed to raise taxes for public works do not 
significantly influence worker productivity cannot be taken as 
sufficient evidence that these policies have insignificant effects 
on social welfare. Until one presents convincing evidence of 
infrastructure’s effects on household welfare derived from 
sources other than household income, the direct social welfare 
effects of infrastructure investments must be considered an 
open question.
Social Value of Public Investments: 
Induced Location Effects
There are many less direct ways in which infrastructure can 
affect economic growth and quality-of-life benefits. In this 
section, we focus on one of the most important ways and one 
that is central to policymaking in metropolitan areas: the 
relationship between infrastructure investments and the 
location of activities. The argument proceeds as follows: after 
reviewing evidence on the relationship between infrastructure 
and the geography of economic activity, we find that 
infrastructure does affect location behavior by changing the 
distribution of firms and households within metropolitan 
The problems inherent in measuring the 
quality-of-life benefits of public works 
have led to an overemphasis on relatively 
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areas. Next, we outline the theoretical and practical conditions 
under which the location behavior of individual firms and 
households affects aggregate social welfare. In the presence of 
spatial externalities (such as traffic congestion or shared local 
public goods), the location choices of individual firms and 
households will have implications for society as a whole. We 
conclude that infrastructure investment that encourages 
decentralization may serve to undermine growth in 
productivity and social welfare.
Infrastructure and Intrametropolitan 
Location Patterns
The idea that public investments, especially in transportation 
systems, alter the intrametropolitan geography of economic 
activity is supported by both the majority of urban theory 
(Fujita 1989) and a substantial historical record (Jackson 1985; 
Tarr 1984). However, location has not been central to the most 
recent empirical work on infrastructure. Implicit in state 
infrastructure productivity studies is the notion that states with 
more public capital might grow faster than those with less. Yet 
few of these studies have taken seriously the possibility that 
marginal additions to infrastructure stock have their most 
important effects on intrastate patterns of activity.
Nonetheless, evidence from studies using a variety of 
methodologies indicates that although the aggregate 
(statewide) economic impact of new public works is small, 
infrastructure’s local effects are much more significant. Here 
we attempt to draw new inferences from the numerous existing 
productivity studies and combine them with historical and 
contemporary evidence on the relationship between public 
works and the location of economic activity. Viewed from a 
geographic perspective, the seemingly conflicting results that 
emerge from studies that use different methodologies tell a 
consistent story. Moreover, the message that emerges is 
surprising: infrastructure is a productive and valuable good, 
but additions to its stock of public capital can actually reduce 
economic growth and social welfare, even before one considers 
the tax cost of new investments. 
Most studies of the role of infrastructure in state-level 
economic growth agree that marginal increases in state public 
investment levels do not have large effects on aggregate output. 
The traditional interpretation of these results is that infra-
structure’s “productivity” is low or negligible. However, there 
is growing evidence for an alternative explanation—that 
infrastructure investment is a costly method of rearranging the 
economic geography of our metropolitan areas, with uncertain 
effects on productivity and welfare.
How Might Infrastructure Affect Location Behavior?
Public works will have important effects on location decisions 
if their benefits differ from one place to another. In the simplest 
framework, the benefits of a public good are the same 
irrespective of location. The usual example is national 
defense—a nuclear arsenal deters foreign attack everywhere in 
the nation. Most public works are fixed in place, however, and 
thus differ from this polar case—they provide the greatest 
benefits to those in a position to utilize them. This is the idea 
behind looking at the relationship between infrastructure and 
economic growth at the state level. However, the benefits from 
new public investments are unlikely to be uniform throughout 
a typical state because states are simply too large. Instead, 
infrastructure investments confer benefits on one part of a state 
relative to other parts, potentially influencing intrastate 
location patterns.
One of the principal reasons for building urban infra-
structure is that it reduces some of the negative effects of urban 
life, allowing cities to grow and increase the productivity and 
consumption advantages they offer. In theory, public roads 
provide fast, cheap intrametropolitan transportation, public 
systems draw water to cities from places where it is abundant, 
and wastewater treatment plants and public landfills help 
dispose of city waste. In theoretical models, improvements to 
transportation and other local public goods increase land 
values in newly served areas, leading to higher density in those 
locations (Fujita 1989; Anas, Arnott, and Small 1998). A clear 
example from U.S. history was the development of urban 
trolley systems, which allowed workers to live farther from 
their workplaces, thereby expanding the size of the urbanized 
area (Jackson 1985; Margo and Atack 1998).
Infrastructure is a productive and valuable 
good, but additions to its stock of public 
capital can actually reduce economic 
growth and social welfare, even before 
one considers the tax cost of new 
investments.6 Infrastructure and Social Welfare in Metropolitan America
How Does Infrastructure Affect Modern 
Metropolitan Location Patterns?
Recent studies of the effects of public capital on intra-
metropolitan patterns of economic activity indicate that the 
place-specific effects of new public investments are substantial. 
These studies share the common assumptions that firms and 
households are mobile and that there is a free market for land. 
In these circumstances, the value of different locations will be 
reflected in local land and labor prices, and the marginal value 
of infrastructure investment may be calculated by comparing 
land values near where the investment took place before and 
after its completion. 
Substantial academic and anecdotal evidence exists to 
support this intuition. Studies have found that land prices 
and infrastructure investments are positively related at the 
intrametropolitan scale (Voith 1993; McDonald and Osuji 
1995; Haughwout 1997, 1999a). Evidence that intrastate 
patterns of activity are significantly influenced by infra-
structure development is available at the county level for 
California (Boarnet 1998) and for the nation as a whole 
(Haughwout 1999b). Using a less formal approach, Garreau 
(1991) points out that the new agglomerations that he calls 
“edge cities” often arise near highway interchanges on the 
fringes of metropolitan areas. If the development of public 
capital stock has positive effects on some parts of state 
economies, one could question how it can have negligible 
effects on states in toto, as found in recent state-level 
productivity studies.
The answer is that the dominant effects of public investment 
must be on the location, not the level, of economic activity 
within states. For example, a given improvement in a state’s 
highway system serves to move activity from its current 
location to newly accessible places elsewhere within that state. 
This conclusion is consistent with the notion that marginal 
increases in the nation’s stock of public capital provide 
localities that receive new public works with an advantage 
compared with those places that get fewer public investment 
dollars. If correct, this description of infrastructure’s benefits is 
very important because it implies that academic researchers 
have been looking in the wrong place in trying to understand 
infrastructure’s effect on social welfare. It also means that, if 
location patterns affect productivity and household welfare, 
then infrastructure’s effects on location patterns may be the 
most important way in which infrastructure influences well-
being. As we explain below, recent evidence on the relationship 
between the location of activities and social welfare indicates 
that location patterns matter.
Location and Social Welfare
The idea that equilibrium location patterns in a market 
economy might have implications for social welfare depends 
on the existence of spatial externalities. If a household’s or 
firm’s choice of location has no effect on the well-being of 
others, then the land market will simply reflect the relative 
value of different locations and no relocation would improve a 
household’s or firm’s own welfare or society’s welfare (Fujita 
1989). However, the very existence of central business districts 
and cities implies that spatial externalities could be important 
and thus the location of activities may have effects on welfare.9
Businesses
A focus on the relationship between the location patterns of 
individual businesses and their productivity is an important 
theme in much of the recent literature on urban growth and 
development (Quigley [1998] and Anas, Arnott, and Small 
[1998] offer reviews of parts of this literature). Most of this 
research argues that the proximity of producers yields 
productivity benefits to these firms. The arguments in favor of 
these so-called agglomeration economies proceed on several 
fronts. First, geographically concentrated producers are 
believed to benefit from shared inputs. If, for example, an 
employee unexpectedly quits, a firm can find a replacement 
more easily if it is near other firms in a dense labor market. This 
proximity will reduce inefficient “down time” and will allow 
maximum use of the firm’s private capital plant. Likewise, 
geographically clustered firms can share the cost and use of 
inputs such as those provided by producer service firms, which 
can operate at efficient scale when there are many potential 
consumers. Large concentrations of producers and consumers 
further allow for the sustainable production of a wider variety 
of goods and services than is available in smaller markets. 
A wider variety of available inputs allows producers to target 
If location patterns affect productivity and 
household welfare, then infrastructure’s 
effects on location patterns may be the 
most important way in which infrastructure 
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their input purchases more precisely, promoting efficiency. 
A final major source of agglomeration benefits to producers is 
information spillovers. The idea that general and specialized 
information about products, processes, and markets circulates 
most freely in environments conducive to frequent formal and 
informal contact is not new (Marshall 1890; Jacobs 1969), but 
it has become increasingly important in recent discussions of 
the sources of economic growth (Lucas 1988; Ciccone and Hall 
1996; Glaeser 1998). 
Households
For households, an analogous set of arguments in favor of 
concentration applies. Households may benefit from the 
sharing of consumption goods that are best constructed on a 
large scale, such as public parks and stadiums. Households may 
value the insurance against unemployment that having 
multiple employers nearby offers, and they may benefit from 
the variety of private consumption goods that are sustainable in 
large agglomerations. Finally, household location may provide 
external effects analogous to the informational spillovers 
hypothesized to exist among firms. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿!"
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿&’￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿!" )￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿*&’￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿( ￿￿*
*￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ +￿￿,￿￿￿￿!"-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿$￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿#￿￿￿(￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿"
Implications
These interactions among individuals and firms are reciprocal 
and not directly priced in markets. Individual firms both 
benefit from and contribute to the information that exists in 
dense agglomerations: although firms recognize the benefits 
they receive, their location decisions will ignore their benefits 
to others. Middle-class households’ participation in local PTAs 
provides benefits to their own children, which they value, and 
to those of other parents, which they may not value. The 
reciprocal nature of these interactions means that individual 
location choices have effects outside the private benefit-cost 
calculus, and that the free market underprovides 
agglomeration. This opens up the possibility that atomistic 
location decisions will lead to socially inefficient patterns of 
business and residential locations.10 
Infrastructure’s Indirect Effect 
on Social Welfare
Even when public capital has value to both firms and house-
holds, its effect on social welfare will be ambiguous when 
location is also important. For example, county employment 
density is an important locational attribute of state economies: 
roughly speaking, states with jobs concentrated in a few 
counties appear to grow faster than those states in which 
employment is more dispersed (Ciccone and Hall 1996). The 
social welfare effect of infrastructure investment will partially 
depend on whether the investment encourages or discourages 
county employment density. The evidence reviewed above 
suggests that current state infrastructure policies serve to 
reduce density, which in turn implies that infrastructure’s 
effect on location offsets at least part of its value to individual 
firms and households.
The intuition is that new state public works serve primarily 
to open up new territory for urban development. Because 
public works are valuable and are disproportionately placed in 
relatively undeveloped areas (Voith 1998b; Haughwout 
1999b), public investments provide individual firms and 
households with incentives to move from more dense to less 
dense environments. In making this decision, individual firms 
and households ignore their contribution to socially beneficial 
density and diversity. The result is too much decentralization 
from society’s perspective. Thus, the irony of the effect of 
infrastructure investment is that it can reduce aggregate 
productivity and welfare, but only if it is productive for 
individual firms and valued by individual households. If 
infrastructure were ineffective in attracting firms to new 
locations, it would not be able to reduce agglomeration 
economies and slow productivity growth. A similar argument 
If infrastructure were ineffective in 
attracting firms to new locations, it would 
not be able to reduce agglomeration 
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applies to households—infrastructure investment will induce 
them to relocate in socially damaging ways only if it is valuable 
to them individually. 
Of course, decentralization, perhaps even excessive decen-
tralization, can occur for reasons totally unrelated to public 
finance, including greater demands for space and income 
growth.11 Infrastructure plays the role of accommodating these 
individual desires. If public works were free goods, there would 
be somewhat less reason for concern, since decentralization 
could arguably be the natural result of a market process. 
Nonetheless, because individual firms and households 
consider only their private costs and benefits of decentralizing 
and ignore the negative effects on others, the private market is 
likely to produce too little density. Thus, social welfare might 
still be improved with careful bargaining over the level and 
location of infrastructure, even if public works were free.
However, public works are not free. Most infrastructure 
research using the aggregate production and cost function 
approaches has downplayed the cost of infrastructure 
investment and focused primarily on its benefits. If it can be 
established that improvements in the stock of public capital 
have little or no effect on the economy, regardless of their cost, 
then there is little reason to be overly concerned with how these 
investments are financed. We argue, however, that the 
distribution of the (financial and nonfinancial) costs of 
infrastructure investment is crucial to understanding the 
incentives for decentralization that they create.12
Selecting and Financing Urban 
Infrastructure Projects
The benefit principle of local public finance states that 
efficiency requires those who benefit from a particular public 
expenditure to pay for it. The finding that marginal increases in 
infrastructure stocks are associated with land-value benefits in 
places that receive new public works implies that efficiency may 
be realized if public investment decisions are made by a local 
institution armed with a land tax. Governments that tax land 
may apply a simple rule of thumb when evaluating proposed 
public works: raise taxes to make investments that will raise the 
price of land after accounting for both the cost of taxes and the 
benefits of the new investment (Brueckner 1979; Brueckner 
and Wingler 1984). As a first approximation, municipal 
governments seem to fit this description, and there is modest 
evidence that local government decisions are approximately 
efficient by this “local property value maximization” standard. 
But the existence of benefit and cost spillovers means that 
locally driven infrastructure policymaking is likely to lead to 
inefficiencies. 
First, local governments in the United States tax property, 
not land. The taxation on property covers both capital and 
land. This raises a host of complex issues about who pays the 
property tax.13 Because capital taxes reduce the national return 
on capital and are paid by owners of capital everywhere, part of 
the financial cost of local spending on public works is exported 
to owners of capital who live outside the jurisdiction that levies 
the tax. When part of the financial cost of investment can be 
exported through the tax system, local governments will 
rationally choose levels of spending in excess of the socially 
optimal amount.
The second major concern is that urban infrastructure 
investments appear to generate substantial benefits and costs 
that spill over municipal boundaries (Haughwout 1997, 
1999a). If infrastructure investments induce relocations, then 
the decision of whether to make investments must be based on 
consideration of both the pluses and minuses. Ideally, the 
policymaking institution must be large enough to internalize 
all the relevant externalities. In urban areas, this would seem to 
suggest a regional authority, with a mandate to finance and 
make those investments that improve overall regional well-
being. Such a body would not make investments that simply 
relocate activity from one place to another, unless the spatial 
reorganization somehow were to offer net benefits. Given the 
evidence on spatial externalities described above, relocations 
that increase density might meet this criterion. 
However, there are no regional infrastructure investment 
authorities with the power to raise taxes to fund investment 
and allocate it according to regional benefit-cost principles. 
The closest approximations are metropolitan planning 
organizations (MPOs), which are empowered under federal 
law to plan and prioritize regional transportation investments. 
Among the criteria that MPOs are mandated to consider is 
metropolitan land use, which theoretically allows them to 
evaluate the effects of new investments on agglomeration 
economies and neighborhood externalities. 
Because individual firms and households 
consider only their private costs and 
benefits of decentralizing and ignore the 
negative effects on others, the private 
market is likely to produce too little density.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 9
However, MPOs are imperfect instruments for planning 
infrastructure investments rationally. The institutional 
structure of these bodies typically makes them unrepresentative 
of the metropolitan area’s population. (See Lewis [1998] and 
Appendix B for information on MPOs in the Second District.) 
In general, political jurisdictions within the planning area are 
equally represented, in spite of the fact that they have unequal 
numbers of residents. For example, the rule in the New York–
northern New Jersey area is one county, one vote, although 
New York City, Jersey City, and Newark each have an 
additional vote. However, tremendous disparities remain: tiny 
Putnam County (population 95,000) has the same formal 
influence as Nassau County (population 1.3 million). 
In addition, MPOs do not choose how much money 
to invest, only the distribution of funds over potential 
improvements (Boarnet and Haughwout 2000). Finally, the 
authority of these bodies is limited to transportation projects 
funded by state and federal governments, meaning that other 
kinds of public investment decisions, including locally funded 
road projects, may be made in a fragmented manner, 
uncoordinated with transportation. Of course, it is valuable to 
match the geographic scale of the decision-making body with 
the area affected by its policies. The geographic area affected by 
transportation investments may be quite different from the 
area affected by sewer investments or public parks, suggesting 
that authorities with different service areas should make these 
different decisions. Yet the complementarities between 
transportation and other capital services suggest that the 
coordination of their planning would offer efficiency gains. 
Finally, funding for local public works involves substantial 
intervention by higher levels of government, particularly at the 
state level. State decision makers might seem to have an 
appropriately broad perspective that allows them to evaluate 
benefits and costs that appear anywhere in the state, but in 
practice direct state infrastructure investments, especially for 
highways, appear to undermine rather than support dense 
urban environments (Haughwout 1999a, 1999b; Voith 1998). 
A better understanding of state infrastructure decision making 
is crucial to rationalizing the nation’s urban infrastructure 
investment policies. For the time being, what is clear is that the 
prominent state role adds to the net local benefits of investment 
by reducing the cost.
Localities in many states depend primarily on property tax 
revenues to finance the local cost of public services. New jobs, 
and especially the commercial and industrial tax base that they 
bring with them, are attractive ways for localities to finance 
new services or reduce tax rates on resident homeowners 
(Danielson and Wolpert 1992). The benefits of new 
development thus give towns strong incentives to build new 
public works funded in large part by nonresidents. Those with 
the most to gain are the rapidly growing areas that tend to be 
most heavily represented on regional transportation planning 
boards, and they presumably use their disproportionate 
influence to bring in money for new roads. These localized 
benefits are financed by the rest of the population, through 
higher taxes and, perhaps, lower productivity growth as our 
cities are undermined.
Conclusion
Some responsibility for making infrastructure investment 
decisions rests with state governments as well as with local and 
regional authorities. Financing, meanwhile, is a complex 
combination of state and local taxes and user charges. A typical 
municipality, which will realize much of the benefit of a new 
investment but pay only a portion of the cost, has significant 
incentives to overinvest. Regional authorities, which could 
theoretically constrain the worst of these impulses, generally 
have limited power and overrepresent underdeveloped, 
sparsely populated areas. Given what we know about the effects 
of infrastructure and the importance of fostering dense urban 
environments, the reform of strategies for investing in urban 
infrastructure could significantly enhance social welfare. 
Accordingly, researchers might consider refining their 
estimates of the spatial scale at which agglomeration benefits 
operate. They might also relate these estimates more directly to 
different types of infrastructure investments. At the same time, 
research into the determinants of investment policies, 
particularly at the state level, seems warranted. 
Our current state of knowledge supports a few tentative 
directions in which policy reform might go. The crucial 
elements in a reform package would be the creation of 
institutions capable of balancing the full costs and benefits of 
new investments and the allocation of direct state investments 
in such a way as to maximize their contribution to aggregate 
There are no regional infrastructure 
investment authorities with the power 
to raise taxes to fund investment and 
allocate it according to regional 
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welfare. Often this will mean relatively more public investment 
in central cities and probably less in their surrounding suburbs. 
The difficulty lies in finding politically feasible changes to 
infrastructure policymaking strategies that will represent real 
improvements to the current system. 
To date, attempts to eliminate state support for infra-
structure investments outside of specifically designated areas 
have been controversial and have met with mixed success. 
Maryland’s “Smart Growth” initiative has been highly touted, 
but it has been in place for only three years (Gurwitt 1999). In 
New Jersey, the state plan has led to conflict between state and 
local governments, as the latter continue to face increasing 
development pressures, giving them incentives to shift the 
financial and nonfinancial costs of infrastructure development 
onto nonresidents (Hamill 1992). 
Local efforts to establish regional authorities with the power 
to make and finance a broad array of infrastructure investments 
have also met with mixed success. In a recent case, voters in 
Jefferson County, Alabama (which includes Birmingham and a 
portion of its suburbs), twice rejected proposals to increase sales 
taxes to fund a regional infrastructure agency that would have 
emphasized funding to the central city (Sweeney 1999). How-
ever, in Atlanta, where sprawl and pollution problems are 
among the worst in the nation, the state has created a powerful 
regional agency to manage and finance infrastructure 
investments (Ehrenhalt 1999). Calls for increased regional 
cooperation on infrastructure and land use have recently been 
heard in even the staunchly small-government-oriented areas of 
San Diego and Dallas (Murphy 2001; Michaels et al. 2001).
All told, the record is mixed, and in most metropolitan areas 
public investment decisions continue to be made on a case-by-
case, locality-by-locality basis. Perhaps the most encouraging 
development is the apparent recognition among suburban 
voters that new infrastructure investments, particularly roads, 
do not seem to solve the problems associated with uncontrolled 
suburban growth (Egan 1998). Purchases of open space and 
regulation of new development are currently the most common 
responses to this problem. Nevertheless, it is a small step from 
this recognition to the conclusion that larger shares of 
infrastructure investment should be directed to maintaining 
and improving existing facilities, which are disproportionately 
found in densely developed central cities. Indeed, politicians, 
including former Vice President Gore (Egan 1998), and the 
popular press (Philadelphia Inquirer 1999) have begun to argue 
that the way to minimize the cost of growth is to direct growth 
into areas that have seen declines and that offer existing, albeit 
aging, infrastructure capacity.
Of course, it is likely no accident that the crucial suburban 
support for managing the location of growth and developing 
city infrastructure systems has occurred during a period of 
extraordinary prosperity. When traffic is among the issues that 
voters most often cite as important, it seems a safe bet that 
times are fairly good. In Seattle, growth management has seen 
support ebb and flow with the region’s economic fortunes 
(Egan 1996). In Birmingham, whites living below the poverty 
line were the group most strongly opposed to the creation of a 
regional authority; wealthier suburbanites and African-
Americans voted for it (Sweeney 1999). In San Diego and 
Dallas, the central city is making the case for regional 
institutions; it is unclear what the suburban reaction 
will be.
Just as the effects of today’s investment decisions will 
be felt for decades to come, marginal adjustments to annual 
investment policies will provide little relief in the short run. 
Durable improvements in the nation’s urban infrastructure 
policymaking require that new institutions with substantial 
staying power be created. Such institutions—to be maximally 
efficient—would accurately represent the region’s population, 
have responsibility for planning and financing regional 
infrastructure investments, and work within an explicit 
mandate to evaluate the land-use changes that result from 
new investments. However, this ideal system will be difficult 
to achieve. 
Perhaps the most important steps one could take in the 
short run are to encourage regional transportation planners to 
consider regionwide land-use effects and to support an open 
exchange of views among the affected parties. A good first step 
would be to create forums in which the regional implications of 
infrastructure investments could be discussed by all interested 
parties, equally represented.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 11
Appendix A: A Mathematical Approach 
The argument is shown mathematically by examining a social 
welfare function. This function provides an ordinal ranking of 
society’s preferences over different outcomes: 
(A1)                        .
Society is made up of individuals; businesses do not play a 
role in the social welfare function except in that they provide 
incomes and otherwise affect the well-being of individuals. 
The idea in equation A1, then, is that social welfare (W) is 
determined in part by total  income (Y), which allows 
consumption of private goods that are traded in markets, and 
in part by other factors that are not reflected in incomes (Z). 
The social value of increases in public investment (G) is 
determined by their effect on these components of social 
welfare. The effect of infrastructure on social welfare is 
given as:
(A2)                       .
The components of infrastructure’s value are represented by 
the terms on the right side of equation A2. 
Infrastructure’s contribution to income (which is also its net 
value as a factor of production) is given as  , and   
translates income changes into changes in social welfare. If 
infrastructure has a positive effect on firms, then workers and 
owners of private capital will see income increase as public 
capital increases, meaning that  . The social value of 




















infrastructure as a contributor to the availability of unpriced 
consumption goods is  . 
If infrastructure has significant effects on the location of 
economic activity (L), then equation A1 must be rewritten 
as:
(A3)            .
Now, the effect of infrastructure growth on social welfare 
is given as:
(A4)      
or
(A5)       .
On the right side of equation A5, the first two terms are 
positive if infrastructure is valuable to households and firms, 
and the signs of the last term will depend on the effect of 
infrastructure on location patterns. For simplicity, let us take L 
as a measure of the density. If density is a good from society’s 
viewpoint (that is, if   and   are positive, as suggested in 
the literature), the social welfare effect of infrastructure 
investment will depend on whether it encourages or 
discourages density (that is, whether   > 0). The evidence 
reviewed suggests that current state infrastructure policies 
serve to reduce density (  < 0), suggesting that infra-
structure’s effect on location may at least partially offset 
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Appendix B: Metropolitan Planning Organizations in the Second District
In the Second Federal Reserve District, metropolitan plan-
ning organizations (MPOs) exist for all urbanized areas. 
Three groups in the New York City region share transpor-
tation planning authority. The New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Council (NYMTC) serves the city and the 
suburban counties of Rockland, Nassau, Suffolk, Putnam, 
and Westchester.  The thirteen-county northern New Jersey 
region is served by the North Jersey Transportation Planning 
Authority (NJTPA). The South Western Regional Planning 
Agency (SWRPA) covers the eight municipalities of lower 
Fairfield County, Connecticut. The structure of the New York 
region’s MPOs is fairly typical of those in other parts of the 
country. 
NYMTC’s voting members are the five suburban county 
executives, the New York City Planning Commission chair-
person, the New York City Department of Transportation 
commissioner, the New York State Department of Trans-
portation commissioner, and the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority chairperson. The NJTPA Board of Trustees consists 
of one elected official from each of the fifteen subregions—the 
thirteen counties and two major cities, Newark and Jersey City. 
The Board also includes a governor’s representative, the 
commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Trans-
portation (NJDOT), the executive directors of New Jersey 
Transit and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
and a citizens’ representative appointed by the governor. 
Only the Connecticut MPO’s makeup is explicitly linked to 
population. Each of the eight Connecticut municipalities is 
represented by two members of SWRPA, with a town receiving 
an additional member for each 50,000 residents. 
The structure of the NYMTC leads to radical differences in 
representation, with Putnam County’s 95,000 residents having 
the same official influence as Nassau’s 1.3 million. Although 
they have two representatives on the MPO, New York City 
residents are still underrepresented by this “votes per capita” 
measure. With 7.4 million residents, the city has one delegate 
per 3.7 million residents, a ratio far lower than any other 
ratio in the region. In New Jersey, the 857,000 residents of 
Bergen County have one vote on their MPO, as do the 
125,000 residents of Hunterdon County. Because the mostly 
densely settled counties are generally those that are relatively 
close to New York City, for most of the area’s residents their 
representation on the MPO depends on how far from 
New York City they live. In general, the rule is the farther 
away the county, the more representation its residents have in 
regional transportation planning. Suffolk County, New York, 
and Ocean County, New Jersey, both have relatively low per 
capita representation and are exceptions to this general rule.
The Structure of Representation of Two Second
District MPOs
County or City MPO
Distance from 
New York City 
(Miles)
MPO
Votes per Million 
Residents
New York City NYMTC 0.0 0.3
Hudson NJTPA 6.1 1.8
Jersey City NJTPA 6.5 4.3
Bergen NJTPA 13.8 1.2
Essex NJTPA 14.4 1.3
Newark NJTPA 11.1 3.8
Union NJTPA 19.3 2.0
Nassau NYMTC 20.3 0.8
Passaic NJTPA 24.7 2.1
Rockland NYMTC 26.1 3.5
Westchester NYMTC 28.6 1.1
Morris NJTPA 30.7 2.2
Middlesex NJTPA 32.6 1.4
Monmouth NJTPA 35.0 1.6
Somerset NJTPA 36.7 3.5
Sussex NJTPA 45.3 6.9
Putnam NYMTC 46.9 10.5
Hunterdon NJTPA 51.5 8.0
Warren NJTPA 53.7 10.0
Ocean NJTPA 64.0 2.0
Suffolk NYMTC 68.5 0.7
Notes: NYMTC is New York Metropolitan Transportation Council; 
NJTPA is North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority. Jersey City 
and Newark each have an additional representative on the NJTPA Board 
of Trustees.Endnotes
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1. Simply maintaining the current public stock costs tens of billions of 
dollars per year. Increasing the available infrastructure stock would 
require even more funding.
2. In 1999, for example, more than 50 percent of all cities considered 
infrastructure needs a top concern, while 68 percent reported 
increasing their infrastructure spending during fiscal year 2000. 
See Pagano and Shock (1999, 2000) for details.
3. Nearly 90 percent of the nation’s nondefense public capital is 
owned by state and local governments. 
4. In 1998, more than 80 percent of the U.S. population lived in 
metropolitan areas. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract 2000, 
Table 33, for details. 
5. Readers interested in the infrastructure productivity literature 
should consult the complete reviews found in Gramlich (1994) and 
Eberts and McMillen (1999). For explicit and implicit critiques of the 
dominant aggregate approaches, see Haughwout (1998, forthcoming) 
and Rudd (2000).
6. State and local governments alone spent nearly $5.7 billion on parks 
and recreation capital in fiscal year 1997. We make the qualification 
here because secondary arguments in favor of park construction may 
mention that happy, healthy workers will be more productive, but we 
take these as comparatively unimportant justifications for these 
expenditures. 
7. The fact that the value of time lost to congestion can be estimated 
does not mean that it is truly priced or that congestion reduces 
national income. Instead, these estimates reflect the value of leisure 
that drivers forgo because of congestion. Many land-use models 
predict that reductions in transportation costs will lead to increased 
residential decentralization (Anas, Arnott, and Small 1998), but 
whether these changes in residential patterns have in fact increased the 
length of commutes is more controversial. Gordon and Richardson 
(1994) argue that residential decentralization has not been 
accompanied by longer commutes, since employment locations have 
tended to decentralize as well.
8. The household present-value estimate of 39 cents per dollar of net 
investment (1.8/4.64 = 0.39) is not directly comparable to the 
Aschauer (1989) elasticity estimate of 0.39, which is an annual figure. 
Aschauer’s result implies that public capital was dramatically 
undersupplied in the nation; the results in Haughwout (forthcoming) 
suggest an oversupply of public capital in large, older central cities.
9. A classic example of a positive spatial externality is the relationship 
between an apiary and an apple orchard. Both benefit from proximity 
to the other: the apple blossoms improve the quality of the honey the 
bees produce and the bees, in turn, help pollinate the apple trees. But 
if the beekeeper has an opportunity to move his hives to another 
location, he would consider only the net benefit to his honey business 
and would ignore any cost his move would have on the apple grower. 
Recent empirical evidence confirms the existence of very significant 
spatial externalities like these in both production and household 
welfare.
10. For individuals’ unpriced consumption, relative proximity 
appears to provide the largest benefits and segregated neighborhoods 
seem to experience negative consequences. Unfortunately, less is 
known about the scale at which the relationship between density and 
welfare’s productivity component operates. This question is 
important: without its answer, we cannot be certain whether a firm’s 
move from the central city to an inner-ring suburb is a cause for 
concern. Identifying this scale is an important component of the 
research agenda outlined in our conclusion.
11. See Anas, Arnott, and Small (1998) for a comprehensive review.
12. Boarnet and Haughwout (2000) discuss the latter point with 
regard to highways; here the focus is on public investment more 
generally.
13. Hamilton (1975) argues that with optimal zoning, local property 
taxation is equivalent to a local benefit tax, but more recent work, 
summarized by Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989), argues that the local 
property tax is partly a benefit tax and partly a tax on capital. In 
addition, some local governments use other taxes, whose statutory 
incidence varies (Haughwout et al. 2000).References
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